Precautionary Corporate Liquidity by Chen, Kaiji et al.
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper Series 
ISSN 1424-0459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 465 
Precautionary Corporate Liquidity 
Kaiji Chen, Zheng Song and Yikai Wang 
January 2010 
 
 
Precautionary Corporate Liquidity
Kaiji Cheny
University of Oslo
Zheng Songz
Fudan University
Yikai Wangx
University of Zurich
This version: February 14th, 2009
Abstract
We develop a theory of corporate liquidity demand, capturing the fact that a rms
borrowing capacity depends on news on future investment protability. In our model, bad
news on future investment protability reduces a rms borrowing capacity and therefore
increases the need for internal nance. Consequently, the rms cash savings respond
negatively to news on future protability. This negative correlation is strongly supported
by our empirical evidence using a combined data set of Compustat and IBES. Moreover,
both our simulation and empirical results show that the sensitivity of cash savings to news
on future protability is a reliable indicator of the presence of nancial constraints at rm
level.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies have found that prospects in both future investment opportunities
and future external borrowing capacity are two key factors in a rms liquidity management.1
An ignored fact by this literature, however, is the rich interaction between these two factors.
In particular, rmsexternal borrowing capacity may rely heavily on their business prospects,
which are largely driven by news on future protability. Examples of this relationship can be
found in recent subprime-mortgage crisis: bad news on future protability caused a tightening
of credit by banks to many rms to prevent future default. Given the key roles of these two
factors, taking into account their interaction may therefore provide new insights into rms
liquidity management. The impact of business prospects on borrowing capacity, moreover,
suggests a unique way of identifying the presence of nancial constraint at rm level, by
observing how corporate savings respond to news on future protability.
The purpose of this paper is therefore two folds: rst, we develop a theory of corporate
liquidity demand, capturing the dependence of rms borrowing capacity on news about future
investment protability.2 Second, we wish to ask to what extent a rms propensity to save
cash out of news on future protability (referred to as the news sensitivity of cash) is a useful
indicator of the presence of nancial constraints at rm level.
Our key model ingredient is the presence of limited enforcement of debt repayment. This
contractual friction limits a rms external borrowing capacity to a fraction of future rm value.
News on future protability can thus have an immediate impact on the external borrowing
capacity via rm value. Consequently, news not only a¤ect the rst best demand for capital
and thus the demand for funds, but also the supply of external funds. The impact of news on
cash savings, which serve to ll the gap between the nancing need and external borrowing
capacity, is therefore governed by the tension between the demand- and supply-side e¤ects.
The major theoretical nding of this paper is that rmscash savings respond negatively
to news on future protability in an economy calibrated to the U.S. data. This result is in
sharp contrast to recent studies by Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) and Riddick and
1See, for example, Almeida, Campello and Weisbash (2005) for evidence on corpoarte cash savings for
nancially constrained rms. Similar message was conveyed by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2006), which nd that
between 1980 and 2004 rms with negative net income, which are more likely to be nancially constrained,
increased cash holdings much faster than rms with positive net incomes. These empirical ndings reect the
fact that a major incentive for rms to hoard cash is to nance future investment in anticipation of future
limited borrowing capacity.
2A tightening of credit standard may further worsen the prospects on rmsportability.
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Whited (2007), both of which nd a positive response of cash savings to future investment
opportunities. Our negative correlation hinges on the impact of news on rms borrowing
capacity. Good news on future protability increase rm value and expand borrowing capacity,
and hence reduce the need for internal nance. Since cash hoarding is costly, this encourages
rms to reduce cash savings and reallocate resource to capital investment.
Our simulation results show that such negative correlation between news and cash savings is
robust to a broad set of parameter values. By contrast, if shocks are on the current technology
and thus the current cash ow, a common assumption in the literature, whether cash savings
respond positively or negatively to such shocks (referred to as the cash ow sensitivity of
cash) turns out to be sensitive to di¤erent parameterization.3 These results suggest that the
use of news sensitivity of cash may provide a more reliable test for nancial constraints than
cash ow sensitivity of cash.
We then proceed on an empirical level to test the key predictions of our model. To ob-
tain proxy for expected rm values, we use a combined data set of Compustat and IBES and
construct the expected rm value by discounting securities analystsforecasts of future earn-
ings.4 Our empirical results provide strong support for our theory. In particular, the estimated
coe¢ cient on expected rm value is signicantly negative under rst di¤erence GMM panel re-
gression. To test the role of news sensitivity of cash as an indicator of the presence of nancial
constraints, we partition the whole sample into two sub-samples with nancially unconstrained
and constrained rms in each alone. Five alternative approaches suggested by the literature
are used for partition: asset size, employee size, payout policy, bond ratings, and commercial
paper ratings. We nd for each of the ve schemes, news sensitivity of cash is negative and
signicantly di¤erent from zero for constrained rms, but not statistically di¤erent from zero
for unconstrained rms. These ndings show that news sensitivity of cash is a reliable indicator
of the presence of nancial constraints at rm level.
Our work is related to several strands of the literature. First, our model specication of
the external borrowing constraint is closely related to Jermann and Quadrini (2006). There
are two main di¤erences, however. First, they shut down the use of liquid asset as a source of
nancing, which is the focus of our paper. Moreover, their paper is interested in the aggregate
implications of nancial constraints, while our purpose is to test directly their implications at
rm level and nd a useful indicator of the presence of nancial constraints.
3The non-robustness of the e¤ects of current cash ow (or cash ow e¤ect) was rst mentioned by Riddick
and Whited (2007) and conrmed by our simulation result.
4Alternatively, one may use Tobins q based on stock market valuation as a proxy for expected rm value.
However, for reasons that will be discussed below, we nd that our measure of average q dominates Tobins q.
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Our paper also contributes to the literature on the e¤ects of nancial constraints on rms
behavior. Despite the recognition for the importance of nancial constraints, the nance and
macroeconomic literature has long debated over strategies to identify the presence of nancing
constraint at rm level. Our work departs from the existing studies in this literature along
three aspects.
First, to our knowledge, this paper is the rst to link rmsexternal borrowing capacity
to news on future protability. This leads us to conclude quite di¤erently from previous
theoretical and empirical results. In both Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) and Riddick
and Whited (2007), rmsborrowing capacity is either xed or unrelated to future protability.
As a result, the response of cash savings to news is typically positive because good news cause
only an increase in future nancing need and, by assumption, have no impact on future supply
of external funds.
Second, our work is among the rst to formalize the impact of news shocks on corporate
savings. Much attempt so far has been made to use the impact of cash ow shocks to identify
the presence of nancial constraints at rm level.5 This approach, however, has been questioned
by many others on both theoretical and empirical ground.6 Our paper nds the robustness
of news sensitivity of cash at both theoretical and empirical level. As a result, it provides an
empirically reliable test of the presence of nancial constraints.
Third, our empirical work, by using analysts earnings forecast data to construct expected
rm values, provides a more precise measure of future protability. Most studies use Tobins q
based on stock market valuation to capture future investment opportunities. This strategy was
challenged by Bond and Cummins (2001), which nd that Tobins q constructed using market
value is systematically biased and serial correlated. Another key nding of that paper is that
using average q constructed from analysts earning forecast make the Q investment model
perform dramatically better. These ndings motivate us to use analysts earning forecast data
to construct expected rm values. Accordingly, our measure of rm value allows us to obtain
a more precise estimate of the e¤ect of news on corporate savings.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a theory of liquidity demand. In
Section 3, we calibrate the model to U.S. data. Section 4 reports and discusses our numerical
results. Section 5 presents the empirical tests of our model implications. Section 6 concludes.
5Beginning with Fazarri, Hubbard and Peterson (1998), researchers have explored the sensitivity of invest-
ment to cash ow to test for the presence of nancial constraint. More recently, Almeida, Campello and
Weisbach, (2004) argue that the e¤ect of nancial constraints can be caputured by the rms propensitiy to
save cash out of cash ow.
6For example, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Erickson and Whited (2000) questioned the robustness of
cross-sectional patterns presented in Fazarri et. al (1988). Riddick and Whited (2007) show that the sign of
cash ow e¤ect is not robust to the persistence of shocks.
3
2 A Model of Liquidity Demand
We consider a discrete time, innite horizon partial equilibrium model. The model structure
is kept as simple as possible to highlight how corporate savings respond to news on future
protability, which govern the tightness of future borrowing capacity.
A risk neutral rm uses capital and labor to produce output. The production technology
is given by
Yt = At
 
Kt H
1 
t

: (1)
where Kt is the beginning-of-period capital, Ht is the labor employed, and At is the level of
technology, which is stochastic.  2 (0; 1) ; implying decreasing returns to scale for production.
The assumption of decreasing returns indicates that the rm generates positive prot. Each
period, working capital is required for production to be operative.7 The size of working capital
required, denoted as f (Kt;Ht), increases with the scale of production.
At each period, with probability 1    the rm becomes unproductive. This variable is
interpreted as the probability that the rm retains the ability to make prot.
2.1 Firm Financing
The working capital required at time t can be nanced from two channels: liquid asset accu-
mulated at the end of period t  1, denoted as Lt; and external borrowing at the beginning of
period from an outside lender. Clearly, if there is no cost to external nance, it is irrelevant
whether to nance the rm from the internal or external funds, and there is no role for liquid
asset.
To give a role for corporate liquidity, we introduce nancial frictions to drive a wedge
between the value of internal and external fund. We assume that the ability to borrow is
bounded by the limited enforcement of the debt repayment à la Jermann and Quadrini (2006).
At the end of the period, the rm has the ability to default the debt repayment. Appendix
shows that the incentive-compatibility condition imposes the following nancial constraint
f (Kt;Ht)  Lt  Vt = Et
24 1X
j=1


1 + r
j
Dt+j
35 ; (2)
where Vt is the value of the rm at the end of period t; r is the interest rate, and Dt+j is the
dividend at period t+ j: Constraint (2) features the endogeneity of borrowing capacities: the
7According to Fazzari and Petersen (1993), for rms in fast growing industries, own-rm innovation and
innovation spillovers generate new investment opportunities continuously. This creates a need for working
capital to smooth investment.
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rm can borrow up to a fraction  against its future value. News on future protability can
thus a¤ect borrowing capacities via rm value. We parameterize f (Kt;Ht) as follows:
f (Kt;Ht) = Kt + (1  )Ht; (3)
where  denotes the fraction of working capital associated with the use of capital.
Finally, following the literature, we assume that a rms dividend payout is subject to a
quadratic adjustment cost. The total cost of payout, Dt; is
' (Dt) = Dt + 
 
Dt  D
2
; (4)
where D represent the long run dividend payout level. In case of negative shocks to current
cash ow or future investment opportunity, this adjustment cost also captures the possible
costs associated with equity issuance, such as the underwriting fees and agency costs.8
2.2 Firms Problem
To capture the interaction between borrowing capacity and rm behaviors, we specify the
rms problem in a stochastic dynamic framework. The only novel feature is our introduction
of the nancial constraint (2).
For analytical convenience, we write this problem recursively. The states of the rms are
capital K and liquid asset L; in addition to the exogenous states s that we shall dene later.
Conditional on survival, the rm choose hours employed H, the dividend D; new capital K 0
and new liquid asset L0; to maximize the value of expected future dividends. The Bellman
equation for the problem is
V (s;K;L) = max
K0;H0;L0;D

D + E


1 + r
V
 
s0;K 0; L0

;
subject to
' (D) = Y   wH  

K
0   (1  )K

   L0   (1 + rL)L ; (5)
K + (1  )H   L  E


1 + r
V
 
s0;K 0; L0

: (6)
where rL is the rate of return for liquid asset. We assume that 1+ rL < 1+r , i.e., rL is strictly
dominated by the interest rate adjusted by the rm survival rate. It is immediate from the
above nancial constraint that borrowing capacities and future rm value interact with each
8Notice that without the dividend issuance cost, the economy is essentially equivalent to a frictionless econ-
omy. In this case, the impact of future investment opportunity on rms borrowing capacity can be costlessly
accommodated through changes in rmsequity.
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other: the former varies in response to changes in the latter. Changes in borrowing capacity,
in turn, a¤ect the rms future value via its impact on optimal decisions of investment and
saving.
The rst order conditions can be written as
(1 + )E


1 + r

1 + rL
'0 (D0)
+ 0

=
1
'0 (D)
; (7)
(1 + )E


1 + r

1 + YK0   
'0 (D0)
  0

=
1
'0 (D)
; (8)
YH   w
'0 (D)
=  (1  ) ; (9)
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the nancial constraint, YX denotes the
partial derivative of Y with respect to variable X.
The LHS of (7) represents the expected marginal return of next-period liquid assets L0. The
direct return of L0, adjusted by dividend payout costs, is equal to (1 + rL) ='0

D
0

. Holding
liquid assets rewards additional 0 via relaxing the next-period nancial constraint. Moreover,
the return of (1 + rL) ='0

D
0

+ 0 is further amplied by the e¤ect of L0 on future rm
value, which provides current liquidity worth of . The RHS of (7) reects the marginal cost
of next-period liquid assets: increasing one-unit of L0 crowds out dividend payout by '0 (D).
Similarly, the LHS and RHS of (8) stand for the marginal returns and costs of next-period
capital K 0, respectively.
Equation (9) shows that the marginal cost of the nancial constraint, , is primarily deter-
mined by the wedge between the marginal labor productivity YH and wage rate w. Intuitively,
one can see from (2) that increasing liquid asset relaxes the nancial constraint and allows the
rm to hire more labor, which pushes the allocation towards the rst-best.
To get some intuition for the role of liquid asset, let us consider the case in which the
constraint (6) is not binding
 
 = 0 = 0

. Then, the Euler equation (7) cannot hold as 1+rL <
1+r
 : In other words, it is optimal to accumulate no liquid asset for an unconstrained rm.
Consequently, (8) and (9) reduce to the standard demand equations for capital and labor:
YK0 =
1+r
   1 +  and YH = w.
Under binding nancial constraint,9 it is easy to show the determinants of corporate savings
9At steady state, (7) becomes  
1 + 
 
1 + r
 
1 + rL + 

= 1:
Steady-state values are marked by overbars. This solves . Our assumption of 1+ rL < 1+r ensures that
 > 0.
Therefore, if  K + (1  ) H <  
1+r
V
 
A; K; L

holds, the nancial constraint will be binding at steady state.
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by rearranging (6):
L0 = K 0 + (1  )H 0| {z }
demand-side e¤ect
  E


1 + r
V
 
A00;K 00; L00

| {z }
supply-side e¤ect
: (10)
(10) shows that the next-period liquid asset, or equivalently corporate savings today (L0 L), is
governed by the tension between next-period working capital and the end-of-next-period rm
value. For instance, future investment opportunities may increase demand for future capital
and labor and thus require a larger size of working capital. This nancing need encourages
more liquid assets to be accumulated today. We refer to this e¤ect on liquid assets as the
demand-side e¤ect. On the other hand, future investment opportunities also increase future
rm value and expand future borrowing capacity, supplying more liquidity that can be used
to substitute for liquid assets. This is referred to as the supply-side e¤ect.
3 Calibration
To obtain a quantitative assessment of the model, we calibrate the economy to the annual
U.S. data. We set  to 0:85, the value used by Atkeson and Kehoe (2001). The parameter
 is then set so that the labor income share is 0.6. This yields a value of  of 0.294. The
depreciation rate  is set to match an investment capital ratio of 0.074, the average between
1960 and 2004. The interest rate, r is set to 4%. We let the rm survival probability  be
0.90, which is broadly consistent with the U.S. data for the manufacturing and business service
sector reported by OECD (2001).
We set rL = 0 for normalization: We choose the value of  so that the ratio of liquid asset
to the sum of liquid and physical asset for the rm at the steady state matches the average
ratio of cash to total assets for a nancially constrained rm in our sample of Compustat data.
As will be explained in more detailed in the empirical part, one of our identication schemes
for a nancially constrained rm is that if a rm does not have a commercial paper rating
during our sample period (1971-2005), it is classied as nancially constrained. Otherwise, it
is considered as a unconstrained rm. Under this scheme, the average ratio of cash to total
asset for constrained rms between 1971 and 2005 is 12:4%. This gives  = 0:31:
We calibrate the value for  such that about half of the working capital is associated with
the use of capital and half with the use of labor.10 The value of w is chosen to target a level
of labor input of 0.33 at steady state.11
10We show later in this paper that our qualitative result regarding the impact of news on cash savings is
robust to any  2 [0; 1):
11Varying w does not change signicantly our qualitative results regarding the impact of news on cash savings.
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We specify the stochastic process for A under two cases in order to understand the impact
of di¤erent shocks on corporate savings via the dynamic interaction between future borrowing
capacity and rm value.
 Case 1: News Shocks on Future Technology:
logAt+1 =  logAt + 
F
t ; (11)
where Ft denotes innovations regarding information on the next period.
 Case 2: Shocks on Current Technology:
logAt =  logAt 1 + Ct : (12)
In this process, Ct a¤ects the current technology At.
Note that the process (11) is di¤erent from the standard AR(1) specication in (12): new
information on At+1 arrives at time t; before it is realized. As a result, next period productivity
is perfectly predictable. In this case, the exogenous state variable s = (A;A0) : By contrast,
in the AR(1) case, a specication widely adopted by the literature, shocks are on the current
level of technology. Accordingly, the exogenous state variable s = A: Since news shocks Ft
a¤ect At+1 directly, specication (11) allows us to isolate the impact of changes in prospect of
future investment opportunity from changes in current technology. Di¤erent from news shocks,
Ct , also called cash ow shock, highlights the impact of a change in the current technology,
which has a rst-order e¤ect on current cash ow. Comparing responses of corporate saving
to the above two types of shocks, therefore, helps distinguish a rms propensity to save cash
out of news (news sensitivity of cash), which is the focus of this paper, from its propensity to
save cash out of changes in current cash ows (cash ow sensitivity of cash).
Following Hennessy and Whited (2007), we set the serial correlation coe¢ cient for shocks
on current technology  = 0:66 and the associated standard deviation of the shock  is set at
0.121. To compare the e¤ects of these two types of shocks, we set the two parameter values for
news shocks to be the same as their counterparts for shocks on current technology. We shall
provide robustness check of our results to  later in this paper.
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values for this economy.
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Table 1. Parameter Values
Symbol Denition Value
 Capital share in production function 0.36
 Entrepreneurial survival rate 0.90
 Decreasing return to scale 0.85
 Depreciation rate for capital 0.07
 Autocorrelation coe¢ cient 0.66
 Standard deviation of information innovation 0.121
r Interest rate 0.04
 Default parameter 0.31
 Share of working capital associated with K 0.43
w Wage rate 0.70
rL Rate of return for liquid asset 0.0
4 Numerical Results
In this section, we present the impulse responses of corporate liquidity under two types of
shocks: news shocks on future protability and cash ow shocks due to unanticipated technol-
ogy uctuation.
4.1 News shock on Future Technology
To examine how the economy reacts to news about future protability, we consider the following
experiment: at period 0, the economy is at steady state. At the beginning of period 1, all agents
receive unanticipated news that the technology A will increase by one percent at period 2. At
the beginning of period 2, the technology improvement is materialized.
[Insert Figure 1]
Panel A of Figure 1 depicts the response of corporate liquidity to good news that arrive
in period 1. We see that the rm reduces cash holdings at the end of period 1, or in other
words corporate saving declines. The underlying mechanism for dissaving in response to good
news about future technology can be seen from Panel B to D, which show the response of
capital, labor and end-of-period rm value, respectively. Not surprisingly, the improvement
of future technology gives rise to future investment opportunity. This generates two e¤ects.
On the one hand, the demand-side e¤ect in the RHS of (10) asks for more liquid assets to be
accumulated in order to nance a larger size of working capital. On the other, good news also
increases rm value and external borrowing capacity, which then works through the supply-side
e¤ect in the RHS of (10) to reduce the demand for liquid asset. Interestingly, the supply-side
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e¤ect turns out to be quantitatively larger than the demand-side e¤ect, since there is a self-
enhancing mechanism for the determination of borrowing capacity: the technological shift
increases borrowing capacity by a¤ecting rm value. The larger borrowing capacity, in turn,
allows the rm to deploy more capital and labor. The feedback thus increases rm value and
borrowing capacity even further.
It is noteworthy that our result regarding the response of cash saving to news is opposite
to Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) and Riddick and Whited (2007). In their models
the tightness of the nancial constraint is unrelated to prospects of future protability. This
shuts down the above-mentioned supply side e¤ect of news shocks. As a result, the response
of cash savings to news is typically positive.
To help understand the resource reallocation following the news shock, we present the re-
sponse of dividend payout in Panel E. Along with a decline in corporate liquidity, dividend
payout increases slightly at period 1. This suggests that the increase in physical capital in-
vestment in response to the good news comes solely from a reallocation of internal funds from
liquidity asset to physical capital.
Panel F shows that cash ows also increase on impact in response to the good news.12
This increase in cash ow arises from an endogenous increase in the labor deployed at period
1 due to the relaxed nancial constraint, as Panel C indicates. Note that under news shocks,
corporate cash ows and corporate liquidity move in the opposite direction. However, as will
be shown below, it is not correct to simply argue that when cash ows increase, corporate
saving must decrease.
4.2 Shocks on Current Technology
We now examine the response of corporate saving to shocks on current technology. We consider
the following experiment: at period 0, the economy is at steady state. At the beginning of
period 1, there is a one-percentage increase to A unanticipatedly. Starting from period 2, A
falls back to the steady state according to (12).
[Insert Figure 2]
Panel A of Figure 2 depicts the response of liquid assets to current technological shock. We
see that the rm chooses to accumulate more liquid assets when the shock to current technology
arrives. The underlying mechanism for the increase of corporate saving can be seen from
Panel B to D, which show how capital and labor response to the current technological shock,
12Cash ow equals rm revenue minus wage.
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respectively. The improvement of the current technology increases capital, labor and end-of-
period rm value, due to its persistent impact on future technology.13 Like news shocks, this
generates both demand-side e¤ect and supply-side e¤ect as in (10). Quantitatively, however,
the supply-side e¤ect is much smaller under shocks to current technology. This is primarily due
to the fact that the impact of the current technological shock on future rm value and future
borrowing capacity is much weaker than that of the news shock, as can be seen by comparing
the magnitude of the increase in rm value at the end of period 2 between Panel D of Figure
1 and 2.
Our positive cash ow sensitivity of cash is opposite to the results in Riddick and Whited
(2007). In their model, which adopted the same persistence for cash ow shocks as ours, cash
ow shocks generate a negative response of cash savings on impact. The key reason for this
disparity lies in the di¤erence of cost of external nances between these two papers: in our
model the presence of nancial constraints implies cost of external nance is extremely high
beyond some upper bound, while in their model the cost of external nance shows up as a
combination of xed and linear-quadratic cost for equity issuance.
Comparing Panel F in Figure 1 and 2, we see that the correlation between corporate saving
and cash ow depends on di¤erent types of shocks. What helps us to identify these two types of
shocks is that shocks to current technology has a rst order impact on the cash ow at period
1, while the corresponding magnitude of the e¤ect of news shock is only of second order. The
opposite is true for the relative magnitude of the impacts of these two shocks on future rm
values. This quantitative di¤erence allows us to identify the partial e¤ects of news on future
protability and changes in current cash ows on corporate liquidity demand in our empirical
exercise.
4.3 Robustness Check
We have shown that in our calibrated models, the rm reduces liquid assets in response to
positive news shock, while liquidity increases in response to positive shocks on the current
technology. In this subsection, we check the robustness of the above results for di¤erent
parameterization. This work provides theoretical ground to answer the question that to what
extent news sensitivity of cash (as opposed to cash ow sensitivity of cash) is a reliable indicator
of the presence of nancial constraints.
We consider our robustness to the following four parameters: the persistency of shocks ,
the payout adjustment cost coe¢ cient , the degree of decreasing returns to scale  and the
13Consistent with an increase in both liquid asset accumulation and physical capital investment, dividend
payout drops drastically at period 1, as illustrated in Panel E.
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coe¢ cient  in (3). The results are presented in Figure 3.
[Insert Figure 3]
It can directly be seen from Figure 3 that the decline of liquid assets in response to good
news is robust to di¤erent parameterization, except for very low persistency of technological
shifts ( < 0:15). In an extreme case where  = 0, the technological improvement at period
2 has no e¤ect on technology afterwards and thus cannot directly a¤ect rm value at the end
of period 2. Consequently, the supply-side e¤ect becomes very small and dominated by the
demand-side e¤ect.
In sharp contrast, the response of liquid assets to shocks on current technology turns out
to be sensitive to di¤erent parameterization, except for the dividend payout adjustment cost
coe¢ cient . In particular, for su¢ ciently persistent shocks ( > 0:70), the technological
improvement at period 1 has a quantitatively sizable e¤ect on rm value at the end of period
2. This gives rise to a large supply-side e¤ect, which dominates the demand-side e¤ect and
leads to a decrease of liquid asset. Also, for su¢ ciently small degree of decreasing return to
scale ( > 0:93) or su¢ ciently large  ( > 0:5), the response of cash to cash ow shocks turn
out to be negative, indicating the dominance of the supply-side e¤ect.
Overall, the results of our robustness check indicate a sharp prediction on the impact of
news on corporate liquidity demand for nancially constrained rms. This allows us to test
our model and the usefulness of news sensitivity of cash to measure nancial constraints using
empirical data. Meanwhile, the non-robustness of the impact of cash ows shocks cast doubt
on the empirical reliability of cash ow sensitivity of cash as a useful indicator of the presence
of nancial constraints at rm level.
5 Empirical Test
Our theory generates the following testable implications. Financially constrained rms should
decrease their stock of liquid assets in response to good news on future protability. By con-
trast, for unconstrained rms the estimate of news sensitivity of cash should not be statistically
di¤erent from zero. Finally, the sign of cash ow sensitivity of cash is ambiguous. We now
test our models main predictions about news and cash ow sensitivities of cash and their
predictability about nancial constraints.
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5.1 Measuring News and Cash Flow Sensitivities of Cash
Ideally, we need news shocks and cash ow shocks as devices to identify news and cash ow
sensitivities of cash. Though direct measures of these two types of shocks are not easy to be
found, we can proxy these two shocks by cash ow and expectations on future protability.
In our model, both shocks a¤ect current cash ow and expected future rm value. However,
as we mentioned above, the quantitative e¤ect of these two shocks on current cash ow and
expected future rm value are very di¤erent. As a result, we can use variables of cash ow
and expected future prots to capture cash ow shocks and news shocks. This implies that,
for the group of nancially constrained rms, we expect to see a negative estimated coe¢ cient
on expected rm value, while for the group of unconstrained rms the estimated coe¢ cients
should be statistically insignicant.
5.2 The Empirical Model
Our estimation equation is:
CHi;t = b1CHi;t 1 + b2CFi;t + b3Qi;t + ai + at + "i;t: (13)
CHi;t is the cash holding level for rm i at the end of period t, CFi;t is the cash ow of rm i
in period t, and Qi;t is the discounted sum of expected prots for rm i since period t. ai and
at denote rm and year e¤ects, respectively. Three remarks on our empirical strategy are in
order.
First, the use of the discounted sum of expected prots as a proxy for expected rm value
deserves some discussion. In the literature, Tobins q is widely adopted to proxy expected
rm value or future investment opportunity. However, as Bond and Cummins (2001) argued,
there is a potential severe problem in Tobins q as a proxy of rm value due to deviations
between stock market and fundamental values. If the deviations are pure random noises,
there are available moments conditions like in Riddick and Whited (2007) or instruments like
lagged nancial variables to get unbiased estimates. But if the deviations are persistent and
dependent on new information about rm fundamental value, all nancial variables related
to the fundamental value would be correlated with the deviations. As a result, no moment
conditions are available to correct the bias. This motivate us to use the direct measure of
expected rm value constructed from securities analystsearnings forecasts, as suggested by
Cummins, Hassett and Oliner (1999), Bond and Cummins (2001).
Second, like Tobins q, our measure of expected rm value is also likely to su¤er from
measurement error problem. Therefore, we apply rst di¤erence GMM, using lagged nancial
13
variables as instrumental variables to get unbiased estimates.
Another important feature of (13) is that we introduce a AR(1) specication to describe
the decision of cash holding. This is compatible with our theoretical framework. As a state
variable in the model, cash available at the beginning of each period is an important factor for
the determination of corporate saving. Moreover, many studies nd that nancially constrained
rms associated with higher Q tend to hold more cash, implying a positive relationship between
cash holding and nancial variables like Q across rms. The corresponding non-availability of
moment conditions casts doubt on the validity of leaving lagged cash in the error term.
5.3 Data
Our data set is a panel of combined Compustat and IBES rms. This is because Compustat
data set provides rms nancial variables like cash ow, and IBES provides essential variables
to construct expected rm prots. We also do the following adjustment to our sample. First,
all nancial variables are CPI adjusted into 1971 dollar. Second, following Almeida et. al.
(2004), Riddick and Whited (2007), we exclude all rms with SIC classication between 4900
and 4999, between 6000 and 6999, or greater than 9000.
We dene variables as follows: booked asset is item 6; cash holding is item 1; cash ow
is item 14 + item 18; expected prots are constructed using expected rst year prot, second
year prot and long term growth rate from analysts. All variables are denominated by booked
asset at the beginning of the year. Observations are dropped if cash holding, cash ow or Q is
missing. In addition, observations with negative asset or Q are also dropped. Finally, we drop
outliers by truncating the 1st and 99th percentage for cash holding, cash ow and Q.
The summary statistics of regression variables are reported in Table 2.
Table 2 Summary Statistics of Regression Variables
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. N. Obs
Cash Holding .112 .056 .136 23305
Cash Flow .113 .111 .072 23305
Q 1.331 1.210 .525 23305
5.4 Financial Constraints Criteria
In order to support our model implication that rmscash policy should be di¤erent between
nancial constrained and unconstrained rm groups, we use ve schemes to partition the
sample into two sub-samples, according to rms asset, employee, bond rating, commercial
paper rating and pay out ratio, which are widely adopted by the literature. Following Bond
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et. al. (2004), each rm is marked as in one group in all its sample years.14
 Scheme 1 - asset: Small rms are more likely to be nancially constrained. If a rms
asset is smaller than the median asset of all rms in the rst year of the rm entering
our sample, we classify the rm as a small rm, thus nancially constrained. Other rms
are unconstrained. This scheme is also used in Bond et. al. (2004).
 Scheme 2 - employee: Number of employees can also be used as a criteria for rm size.
So we use number of employee to classify rms in the same way as in scheme 1.
 Scheme 3 - pay out ratio: The payout ratio is the ratio of total distributions to operating
income. Because nancially constrained rms are likely to pay less dividend, we use it
to classify groups by a similar way as in scheme 1 and 2: if the pay out ratio of a rm is
lower than the median of the rst year of the rm entering our sample, we regard it as
nancially constrained.
 Scheme 4 - bond rating: This variable reects market assessment of a rms credit quality.
If a rm has never had a bond rating during our sample period, it may nd it di¢ cult to
obtain external nance. Thus we classify it as nancially constrained. A rm has ever
had bond rating are counted as unconstrained.
 Scheme 5 - commercial paper rating: This is also a variable reecting market assessment
of credit quality. We use it as an alternative measurement of nancial constraints. The
way of rm classication is the same as in scheme 4.
Table 3 presents summary statistics of cash holdings in our sample of nancially constrained
and unconstrained rms. Consistent with Almeida et al. (2004), our sample also shows that
constrained rms hold far more cash than unconstrained ones.
14This is because in rst-di¤erence GMM, we can not sort di¤erent year observations of one rm into di¤erent
groups.
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of Cash Holdings
Cash Holdings Mean Median Std. Dev Obs.
Financial Constraint Criteria
1. Firm asset
Constrained rms 0.137 0.075 0.154 13850
unconstrained rms 0.074 0.040 0.090 9455
2. Firm employee number
Constrained rms 0.136 0.071 0.155 13668
unconstrained rms 0.077 0.042 0.090 9174
3. Payout ratio
Constrained rms 0.129 0.066 0.150 14710
unconstrained rms 0.082 0.045 0.100 8569
4. Bond ratings
Constrained rms 0.150 0.087 0.161 10230
unconstrained rms 0.082 0.044 0.102 13075
5. Comm. paper ratings
Constrained rms 0.128 0.067 0.148 16881
unconstrained rms 0.071 0.040 0.084 6424
5.5 Results
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the whole sample. In addition to rst-di¤erence
GMM, we also report results from pooled OLS (the rst column) and within group estimation
(the second) for comparisons. Following Bond and Cummins (2001), we use 3- and 4- year
lagged CH and CF as instrumental variables in rst di¤erence GMM. The third column reports
the estimated results. One can see that the specication passes the Hansen test, suggesting
the validity of the lagged variables as instruments.15
The main nding from Table 4 is that the key coe¢ cient of interest, b3, turns out to
be signicantly negative in all specications. Aside from the qualitatively robust feature of
b3, some quantitative di¤erences across specications are worth being mentioned. First, the
smaller absolute values of b3 in the rst and second column are consistent with the previous
nding of a positive correlation between Q and CH; which tends to bias the coe¢ cient of Q
upwards. Second, the estimated coe¢ cient of CHt 1 in the rst column is much larger than
the one from within group and rst di¤erence GMM estimation. This is not surprising, as
pooled OLS does not control rm specic e¤ects. The lowest estimated coe¢ cient of CHt 1
in the second column shows the downward bias problem when using within group estimation
for dynamic panel models.
15The rst-di¤erenced errors are second-order correlated, implying that cash policy may also be inuenced by
variables other than Q and CF . Fortunately, this will not bias the estimated coe¢ cients of Q and CF; which
we are interested in, since our instruments are not correlated with error terms.
16
Table 4. Alternative Estimates of Corporate Propensity to Save
OLS FE GMM
CHt 1 .850*** .474*** .636***
(.005) (.010) (.048)
CFt .143*** .277*** .263*
(.009) (.013) (.140)
Qt -.005*** -.013*** -.036**
(.001) (.002) (.017)
m1 - - -12.88
m2 - - 3.72
Hansen - - 0.777
Obs. 20086 20086 17239
Note: ***, ** and * is signicant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard deviations are
in brackets. OLS, FE and GMM stands for pooled OLS, within group estimation and rst di¤erence
GMM, respectively. m1 andm2 are tests for rst and second order serial correlation for rst-di¤erenced
residuals, respectively.
We next divide rms into constrained and unconstrained groups according to the ve
schemes, and run rst di¤erence GMM for each group sample. The results are presented in
Table 5.
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Table 5. Regression on Two Groups
1: Asset 2: Employee 3: Payout Ratio 4: Bond Rating 5: CP Rating
con. uncon. con. uncon. con. uncon. con. uncon. con. uncon.
CHt 1 .629*** .526*** .602*** .562*** .645*** .404*** .616*** .590*** .559*** .522***
(.057) (.068) (.061) (.071) (.056) (.075) (.058) (.065) (.064) (.063)
CF t .358*** .030 .384*** .096 .340*** .137 .260* .307** .412*** .211
(.117) (.157) (.126) (.178) (.129) (.130) (.154) (.134) (.100) (.178)
Qt -.039** .012 -.049*** -.020 -.043** -.007 -.041** .002 -.048** -.019
(.017) (.017) (.017) (.023) (.019) (.019) (.021) (.020) (.020) ( .018)
m1 -11.04 -8.06 -10.36 -7.95 -11.34 -5.80 -10.61 -8.41 -9.15 -8.70
m2 3.34 1.09 2.84 2.51 3.54 0.79 2.79 2.80 2.19 2.64
Hansen 0.847 0.377 0.771 0.491 0.799 0.123 0.660 0.361 0.813 0.570
Obs. 9772 7467 9613 7626 11882 5357 10259 6980 7028 10211
Note: ***, ** and * is signicant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard deviations are in
brackets. "con" and "uncon" refers to constrained and unconstrained group, respectively. m1 and m2
are tests for rst and second order serial correlation for rst-di¤erenced residuals, respectively.
We see that for each of the ve schemes, news sensitivity of cash, reected by the coe¢ cient
of Q, is negative and signicantly di¤erent from zero for constrained rms. By contrast, it
is not signicantly di¤erent from zero for unconstrained rms. Also, although most schemes
show a positive relation between cash holdings and cash ows for constrained rms, we see
that cash ow sensitivity of cash is larger for unconstrained than constrained rms, if bond
rate is used as the identication scheme. Therefore we conclude that news sensitivity of cash
is an empirically more reliable indicator of the presence of nancial constraints than cash ow
sensitivity of cash.
These estimated results are in sharp contrast to positive coe¢ cients of rm value found
by Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) and Riddick and Whited (2007). The di¤erence
is primarily because rm specic e¤ects and lagged cash holdings are omitted in these two
studies, which therefore tend to bias the coe¢ cient of Q upward.
To conclude, we nd that nancially constrained rms reduce cash holding when good news
on future protability arrive, while such news has no e¤ect on cash policy of unconstrained
rms. In addition, the e¤ect of cash ow on cash policy is ambiguous. All these ndings are
consistent with our theoretical predictions on the news and cash ow sensitivities of cash.
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6 Conclusion
We develop a theory of corporate liquidity demand, capturing the fact that rms external
borrowing capacity depends on news on future investment opportunities. The incorporation of
the impact of news on borrowing capacity leads us to conclude quite di¤erently from previous
theoretical and empirical results. In particular, we nd that cash savings respond negatively
to news on future protability. This negative response occurs because good news on future
protability expand the external borrowing capacity and therefore provide additional resource
for nancing. The increase in the supply of external funds dominates the increase in the rst-
best demand for investment, causing a decline in the demand for internal nance. By contrast,
in early studies where rmsborrowing capacity is xed or unrelated to news, the response of
cash savings to news is typically positive, because good news cause only an increase in future
nancing need.
We nd strong empirical support for the negative impact of news on cash holdings, using a
combined data set of Compustat and IBES. Furthermore, this negative impact is only signi-
cant for nancially constrained rms under each of the ve schemes suggested by the literature
to classify rms into constrained and unconstrained one. Therefore, we conclude that news
sensitivity of cash is an empirically reliable indicator of the presence of nancial constraints at
rm level.
7 Appendix
In this section, we derive the nancial constraint (2). Assume production at each period
requires an amount of working capital, denoted as ft = f (Kt;Ht) ; with both f1 and f2 strictly
positive; where fx is the partial derivative of f with respect to the x-th argument. Working
capital is used at the beginning of time t and are recovered at the end of time t; after all
transactions have been completed: At the beginning of each period, The rm borrows the
nancing gap between the working capital required ft and its internal fund, Lt; from the
outside lender. At the end of each period, debt is repaid back. Because this is a intra-period
loan, the net interest payment is zero.
The rm has the ability to default the debt repayment.16 Upon default, the lender can take
over the rm and recover a fraction  of the end-of-period rm value, denoted as Vt, which is
the simply the present discount value of the expected dividend payout from tomorrow on: Here
16Similarly, Hart and Moore (1998) assume that beyond the project cost, a fraction of the loan that the debtor
receives from the creditor represents the nonrecourse nancing, which is not seizable by the creditor.
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the underlying assumption is that only the rm has the required talent to produce e¢ ciently.
Denote by ! the bargaining power of the rm and 1   ! the bargaining power of the lender.
Bargaining is over the repayment of the debt, denoted as bft. If they reach an agreement, the
entrepreneur gets (ft   Lt)  bft + Vt; and the lender gets bft, If there is no agreement, the rm
gets ft Lt and the lender gets Vt: Therefore, the net value for the rm to reach an agreement
is Vt   bft and the net value for lender is bft   Vt: The bargaining problem solves:
maxbft

Vt   bft!  bft   Vt1 !
Taking the rst order condition, we get bft = [1  ! (1  )]Vt: Incentive compatibility
requires that for the rm the value of nondefault, Vt; should be no less than the value of
default, that is (ft   Lt)  bft + Vt. Hence we have
[1  ! (1  )]Vt  ft   Lt
Denote [1  ! (1  )] as : Then we get (2) in our model.
20
References
[1] Atkeson A. and P. Kehoe (2001), The Transition to a New Economy after the second
Industrial Revolution,Minneapolis Fed Working Paper #606
[2] Almeida, H., M. Campello and M. Weisbach (2004), The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash,
Journal of Finance, 4, 1777-1804
[3] Bates, T., K. Kahle and R. Stulz (2007), Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More cash
than They Used To?NBER working paper, w12534
[4] Bond, S. and J. Cummins (2001), Noisy Share Prices and the Q Model of Investment,
IFS Working Papers, W01/22
[5] Bond, S., A. Klemm, R. Newton-Smith, M. Syed and Gertjan Vlieghe (2004), The Roles
of Expected Protability, Tobins Q and Cash Flow in Econometric Models of Company
Investment, IFS Working Papers, W04/12
[6] Cummins, J., K. Hassett, and S. Oliner (2006), Investment behavior, Observable Expec-
tations and Internal Funds,American Economic Review, 96(3), 796-810
[7] Erickson, T. and T.M. Whited (2000), Measurement Error and the Relationshipbetween
investment and Q, Journal of Political Economy, 108, 1027-1057
[8] Fazarri, S. G. Hubbard and B. Petersen (1988), Financing Constraints and Corporate
Investment, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity,1 141-195
[9] Fazzari, S. and B. Petersen (1993), Working Capital and Fixed Investment: New Evidence
on Financing Constraint,RAND Journal of Economics, 24, 328-342
[10] Hart, O. and J. Moore (1998), Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1-41
[11] Hennessy, C. and T. Whited (2007), How Costly is External Financing? Evidence from
a Structual Estimation, Journal of Finance, 62, 1705-1745
[12] Jermann, U. and V. Quadrini (2006b), Financial Innovations and Macroeconomic Volatil-
ity,NBER working paper, 12308
[13] Kaplan, S., and L. Zingales (1997), Do Investment-cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful
Measures of Financial Constraints?,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 169-215
21
[14] OECD (2001), Productivity and Firm Dynamics: Evidence from Microdata,Economic
Outlook, 69(1), 209-223
[15] Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz and R. Williamson (1999), The Determinants and
Implications of Corporate Cash Holdings,Journal of Financial Economics, 52, 3-46
[16] Riddick, L. and T. Whited (2007), The Corporate Propensity to Save, forthcoming,
Journal of Finance
22
